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    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="nlm-ta">Rea Press</journal-id>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">null</journal-id>
      <journal-title>Rea Press</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">3009-4496</issn><issn pub-type="epub">3009-4496</issn><publisher>
      	<publisher-name>Rea Press</publisher-name>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">https://doi.org/10.22105/masi.v3i2.105</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Research Article</subject>
        </subj-group>
        <subj-group><subject>Electronic voting machines, Freebie culture, Electoral finance, Black money, Fiscal crowding out, Populist redistribution, Human development, VVPAT, Electoral bonds</subject></subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Democracy, Freebies, and Development: The Indian Paradox</article-title><subtitle>Democracy, Freebies, and Development: The Indian Paradox</subtitle></title-group>
      <contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author">
	<name name-style="western">
	<surname>Behera</surname>
		<given-names>Janardan </given-names>
	</name>
	<aff>Department of Statistics, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, India.</aff>
	</contrib></contrib-group>		
      <pub-date pub-type="ppub">
        <month>06</month>
        <year>2026</year>
      </pub-date>
      <pub-date pub-type="epub">
        <day>13</day>
        <month>06</month>
        <year>2026</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>3</volume>
      <issue>2</issue>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>© 2026 Rea Press</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/"><p>This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</p></license>
      </permissions>
      <related-article related-article-type="companion" vol="2" page="e235" id="RA1" ext-link-type="pmc">
			<article-title>Democracy, Freebies, and Development: The Indian Paradox</article-title>
      </related-article>
	  <abstract abstract-type="toc">
		<p>
			India’s democracy, the largest by voter count, lives with a quiet paradox: GDP grows at 6% a year, yet human development barely stirs. This article traces that gap to three interlocking forces: The contested legitimacy of Electronic Voting Machines, the runaway freebie spiral among state governments, and the murky financing of electoral competition. Using RBI State Finances (2022-2025) reports, the ACM CCS security study by Wolchok et al. [1], PRS Legislative Research, examining the 2024 twin rulings of the Supreme Court on VVPAT verification and on the Electoral Bond Scheme, and datasets on the wealth of ADR candidates, the article illustrates how Indian politics (electoral in particular) invariably exchanges long-run public provision for short-run handouts. These figures paint a grim picture. Expenditure on subsidies in 24 states was Rs 3,18,815 crore in FY2023-24, constituting 9% of total revenue receipts, with Punjab hogging out roads, schools, and hospitals at 21%. Rs 1.35 lakh crore was the estimated cost of conducting the 2024 general election, the highest ever in the world on a per-voter basis, while the Electoral Bond Scheme had funneled in Rs 12,979 crore in anonymous corporate monies before the Supreme Court struck it down in February 2024. India consequently ranks 134th on the Human Development Index (HDI) despite being the fifth-largest economy; only 43% of Class 5 rural children can read a Class 2 text; public health spending at 2.1% of GDP is less than one-quarter of the OECD average. The article closes with a five-pillar reform agenda grounded in comparative democratic experience and India’s own constitutional framework.
		</p>
		</abstract>
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